Controlling the international stock pollutant with policies depending on target values by Casas, Omar J. & Romera, Rosario
 
 
Working Paper 09-60 
Statistics and Econometrics Series 19 
September 2009 
 
Departamento de Estadística 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Calle Madrid, 126
28903 Getafe (Spain)
Fax (34) 91 624-98-49
CONTROLLING THE INTERNATIONAL STOCK POLLUTANT WITH 
POLICIES DEPENDING ON TARGET VALUES 
 
Omar J. Casas1 and Rosario Romera2
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper a stochastic dynamic game formulation of the economics of international 
environmental agreements on the transnational pollution control, when the 
environmental damage arises from stock pollutant that accumulates, for accumulating 
pollutants such as CO2 in the atmosphere is provided. To improve the non-cooperative 
equilibrium among countries, we propose a different criterion to the minimization of the 
expected discounted total cost. Moreover, we consider Cooperative versus Non-
cooperative Stochastic Dynamic Games formulated as Markov Decision Processes 
(MDP). We propose a new alternative where the decision-maker wants to maximize the 
probability that some total performance of the dynamical game does not exceed a target 
value during a fixed period of time. The task requirements are therefore formulated as 
probabilities rather than expectations. This approach is different from the standard 
MDP, which uses performance criteria based on the expected value of some index. We 
present properties of the optimal policies obtained under this new perspective. 
 
 
Keywords: Stochastic Optimal Control, Markov Decision Processes, Stochastic 
Dynamic Programming, Stochastic Dynamic Games, International Pollutant Control, 
Environmental Economics, Sustainability, Probability Criterion 
 
JEL Classification: C610, C630, C730, C44, D70, Q20 
 
                                                          
1 O. Casas, Statistics Department, Universidad Carlos III Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, Spain,  
e-mail: omar.casas@uc3m.es. Corresponding author. 
2 R. Romera, Statistics Department, Universidad Carlos III Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, 
Spain,  e-mail: rosario.romera@uc3m.es.  
The authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, research 
projects SEJ2004-03303 and SEJ2007-64500. 
 
Controlling the International Stock Pollutant
with Policies Depending on Target Values
Omar J. Casas and Rosario Romera ∗
July 22, 2009
Abstract
In this paper a stochastic dynamic game formulation of the eco-
nomics of international environmental agreements on the transnational
pollution control, when the environmental damage arises from stock
pollutant that accumulates, for accumulating pollutants such as CO2
in the atmosphere is provided. To improve the non-cooperative equi-
librium among countries, we propose a different criteria to the mini-
mization of the expected discounted total cost. Moreover, we consider
Cooperative versus Non-cooperative Stochastic Dynamic Games for-
mulated as Markov Decision Processes (MDP). We propose a new al-
ternative where the decision-maker wants to maximize the probability
that some total performance of the dynamical game does not exceed a
target value during a fixed period of time. The task requirements are
therefore formulated as probabilities rather than expectations. This
approach is different from the standard MDP, which uses performance
criteria based on the expected value of some index. We present prop-
erties of the optimal policies obtained under this new perspective.
Keywords: Stochastic Dynamic Games, Markov Decision Processes,
Probability Criterion.
AMS Classification: 93E03, 91A15, 91B26
∗Authors address: Statistics Department. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, c/
Madrid, 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid), Spain. E-mails: omar.casas@uc3m.es and
rosario.romera@uc3m.es. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish
Ministry of Education and Science, research projects SEJ2004-03303 and SEJ2007-64500.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Monte Verita` Conference on Sus-
tainable Resource Use and Economic Dynamics, held in Ascona, Switzerland, June 2-5,
2008.
1
1 Introduction
In the last years, the theory on international environmental agreements (IEA)
and the prospect of climate change has motivated many game theoretic stud-
ies, often focused on cooperation and core solutions.
The need of cooperation amongst the countries involved, if a social opti-
mum is to be achieved, has already been addressed in the literature in terms
of Game Theory concepts; see e.g. Barrett (2003), Finus (2001), Flam (2006)
for a review on these topics. With a few exceptions, this literature works with
simple static models of pollution despite the fact that many of the important
environmental problems, as climate change, the depletion of the ozone layer
or the acid rain problem, are caused by a stock pollutant. However, the stock
of pollution may change in the course of the game, as a result of a positive
rate of natural decay and emissions of the countries. Thus, the presence of a
stock pollutant leads to a dynamic game that is not strictly repeated.
In the framework of a deterministic cooperative game with a dynamic,
multi-regional integrated assessment model, Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003)
calculates the optimal path of abatement and aggregated discounted welfare
for each region. They apply the transfer scheme advocated by Chander and
Tulkens (1997), the idea of surplus sharing is used for determining the transfer
scheme, and they compute all possible partial agreement Nash equilibria.
They found that allocation in the full cooperation lies in the core of the
emission abatement game under this specific transfer scheme.
The transfer schemes are based on a single year for assigning the per-
mits or shares in the surplus. Such static schemes are also often observed
in reality, e.g. the reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol are designed as
reduction compared to 1990 levels. These static schemes, however, do not
take into account that the future growth paths of emissions are expected to
diverge substantially between regions. This leads to assignments where his-
torically large emitters obtain relatively large shares of the permits/surplus,
while fast-growing developing countries, as China or India, obtain relatively
small shares. This leads to increasing burdens on these developing countries
to reduce theirs emissions; a notion brought forward by many developing
countries in their argumentation on why they do not agree on any reduction
targets in the Kyoto Protocol.
The role of transfer in the analysis of self-enforcing international environ-
mental agreements (IEA) was developed in Carraro, Eyckmans, and Finus
(2006). They propose transfers using internal and external financial resources
for making welfare optimal agreements. To illustrate the relevance of their
transfer scheme, they use a stylized integrated assessment simulation model
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of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may induce almost all
countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.
The studies by Germain, Toint, Tulkens, and de Zeeuw (2003) have ad-
dressed the issue of how many countries will be interested in signing an IEA
with stock pollutant, adopting a cooperative game-theory approach. They
extend the result established by Chander and Tulkens (1995) and (1997) for
flow pollutants to the larger context of closed-loop (feedback) dynamic games
with a stock pollutant. In this context, cooperation is negotiated at each pe-
riod but financial transfers provide incentives to the countries that ensures
the implementation of the grand coalition at each period. Their model thus
yields a sequence of full cooperative international agreements so that full
cooperation is also achieved in a dynamic setting with a stock pollutant.
Another paper related with this issue using a cooperative game-theory
approach is Petrosjan and Zaccour (2003). However, in this paper the authors
assume that all the countries decide to cooperate at the initial time-consistent
decomposition of each player’s total cost, as given by Shapley value, so that
the countries stick at each moment to the full cooperative solution agreed at
initial time, supposing that the global allocation problem has been solved.
Nevertheless, there are only a few attempts in the stock pollutant control
literature modelling that issue in a stochastic control framework.
Stochastic Programming is considered by Dechert and O’Donnell (2006)
in a particular application that explore some fundamental issues of the op-
timal level of pollution in a lake with competing uses, they show how the
model can be interpreted as an open loop dynamic game, where the con-
trol variables are the levels of phosphorus discharged into the watershed of
the lake, the state of the system is the accumulated level of phosphorus in
the lake and the random shock (a multiplicative noise factor on the control
variables of the players) is the rainfall that washes the phosphorus in the
lake.
The use of stochastic control models to develop climate-economy models
has been advocated by Haurie and Viguier (2003) to represent the possible
competition between Russia and China on the international market of carbon
emissions permits, their model includes a representation of the uncertainty
concerning the date of entry of developing countries on this market in the
form of an event tree. Also by Bahn, Haurie, and Malhame´ (2008), they show
how a piecewise deterministic stochastic control model, over an infinite time
horizon, can be used as a paradigm for the design of efficient climate policy,
their model recognizes the existing uncertainty concerning the true sensitivity
of climate, and the fact that the solution to the climate change issue may
reside in the introduction of new carbon-free technologies. Keller, Bolker, and
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Bradford (2004) have already explored the combined effects of uncertainty
and learning about a climate threshold (an uncertain ocean thermohaline
circulation collapse) in an economic optimal growth model.
The stability of an International Environmental Agreement among n
countries that emit pollutant are studied using differential games, defined
in continuous time, by Jorgensen, Mart´ın-Herra´n, and Zaccour (2003) and
(2004), Rubio and Casino (2005), among others.
As far as we know, none stochastic formulation for the finite and dis-
crete horizon dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements
on transnational pollution control has been introduce as an extension of
the issues presented in Germain, Toint, Tulkens, and de Zeeuw (2003). We
adopt this point of view because to consider randomness on the factors in
the model is closer to reality (see Casas and Romera (2005) and Casas and
Romera (2009)).
In this paper, we propose an alternative scheme for the non-cooperative
game based on probability criteria for which a core property is proved ana-
lytically in a stochastic dynamic (closed-loop) game theoretic context. The
cooperative and non-cooperative models are formulated as a MDP with con-
straints for which alternative criteria are considered. Although optimal poli-
cies under the standard criteria (expectation optimality criteria) are compu-
tationally simple and useful for many real-life problems, the optimal policies
obtained are not reliable when considering a simple or a few decision pro-
cess, since only the average performance over many trials is guaranteed to be
optimal. Therefore, our approach considers that the decision-maker wants
to maximize the probability that some performance (cost) of the dynami-
cal system does not exceed a target value during the fixed period of time
[0; T ]. It follows that our problem is essentially different from these classi-
cal MDP models, see e.g. Puterman (2005), Altman (1999) and Krass and
Vrieze (2002). The main results obtained are: (i) the optimal value function
are distribution functions of the target value, and (ii) there exists an optimal
deterministic Markov policy. These models proposed are directly linked with
the Kyoto or post-Kyoto agreement mechanisms.
Probability criterion for MDP is considered by Wu and Lin (1999) that
studies the minimizing risk problems with countable state space and reward
set, Filar and Petrosjan (2000), Boda, Filar, Li, and Spanjers (2004) for
the problem of optimal control of a retirement investment fund over a finite
horizon with a target hitting time criteria, among other authors. Stochastic
optimization problems should be solved by Stochastic Dynamic Programming
Techniques (see Bertsekas (2000)).
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In this paper we propose a new alternative model with probability perfor-
mance criteria, where the decision-maker wants to maximize the probability
that some total performance of the dynamical game does not exceed a target
value (X) during a fixed period of time. The task requirements are there-
fore formulated as probabilities rather than expectations. This approach is
different from the standard MDP, which use performance criteria based on
the expected value of some index. Moreover, we obtain the existence of an
optimal policy and we present properties of the optimal policies obtained
under this new perspective. In absence of international cooperation, these
optimal policies obtained under this new perspective could be an alternative
behavior for each country which finally will help reducing the international
stock pollutant. The target value (X) could be chosen by each country, ac-
cording some particular negotiation. Usually the target value (X) should
be a quantity ranging between the non-cooperative value function and the
cooperative value function. These schemes are also suitable in the context of
coalitional rationality.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the interna-
tional stock pollutant model with its components, the cost functional compo-
nents and their elements, the description of the modes of countries behaviour,
the stock pollutant control models, cooperative and non cooperative, and the
underlaying Markov Decision Process (MDP). In Section 3, we report our new
proposal of non cooperative model with policies depending on target values,
with necessary definitions. In Section 4, we present an algorithm which com-
putes optimal value functions, optimal action sets, and optimal policies for
a finite horizon model. In Section 5, we present a numerical example based
on real scenarios borrowed from the work by Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003)
and Casas and Romera (2009). In Section 6, we present some conclusions
and extensions of our work.
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2 Stock Pollutant Control Model
We adopt the point of view of the issues presented in Germain, Toint,
Tulkens, and de Zeeuw (2003).
In our model, we introduce a stochastic dynamic game formulation, with
finite and discrete planing horizon analysis of IEA on transnational pollution
control, as an extension of these issues.
Model Components
In our formulation we consider a Markovian Game described by a tuple
G = {J, S, (Ei, ri)i∈J , p, T }
with the following elements
• There are n players and J = {1, 2, ..., n} denotes the set of countries or
regions which we simplify refer to as countries in the sequel.
• S is a Borel subset of some Polish (i.e., complete, separable, metric)
countable and non empty space; is the state space of the game, with
typical element s. The state transition dynamics is a function of the
current state of the system and an additive noise factor on each period
of time. The state of the system is the accumulated level of pollution
in the atmosphere, given by st as stock of pollutant at each period t,
st ∈ S, according to the state equation
st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt , 1 ≤ t ≤ T (1)
Where
– s0 is the initial stock of pollutant or preindustrial level, given.
– δ is the pollutant’s natural rate of atmospheric absorption of CO2
between two periods of time, such that 0 < δ < 1.
• p specifies the law of motion (or transition probabilities) for the game
by associating with each (s, a) ∈ S × E a probability p(·|s, e) over the
Borel sets of S.
• A finite planing horizon with discrete-time periods t, such that
t ∈ T = {1, 2, ..., T} ⊂ Z+.
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• The control variables or action variables are eit, where et = (e1t; e2t; ...; ent)
′
is the vector of the different countries emissions of pollutant at each
period t, entailed by economic activity, where eit ∈ E and E is the
countable and non empty overall control space or action space, and
E =
⋃
s∈S
E(s),
where E(s) is the set of admissible actions (emissions), when the system
is in each state (pollutant level) s. For each s ∈ S the set E(s) is finite.
• The random disturbance ξt is a noise process: a sequence of i.i.d. ran-
dom variables and independent of the initial state s0, with
E [ξt] = 0, σ
2 = E
[
ξ2t
]
< ∞, ∀t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1. (2)
We consider stock of pollutant in a wide sense, not restricted to the car-
bon dioxide (CO2) stock level. Inclusion of manifold pollutants is important.
To wit, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change limits aggregate emissions of six direct greenhouse gases, such as:
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluoro-
carbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)), as
well for the indirect greenhouse gases such as SO2, NOx, CO and/or micro
particles of industrial pollution (between 0.1 y 2.5 µ-meters). The emissions
are aggregated and considered as CO2 equivalents.
Functional Cost Components
Following Jorgensen and Zaccour (2001) among many others, we assume that
the emissions are proportional to production. Additionally we consider
• Future costs are discounted by the constant and positive discount factor
β with 0 < β ≤ 1.
• ci(eit) : function that measures in monetary terms the total cost in-
curred by country i ∈ J at period t ∈ T from limiting its own industrial
emissions to eit; is a differentiable, decreasing (c
′
i < 0) and strictly con-
vex function (c′′i > 0).
• di(st) : function that measures in monetary terms the damages caused
by the stock of pollutant st during the time period t for the i-th country;
is a differentiable, increasing (d′i > 0) and convex function (d
′′
i ≥ 0).
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• ri(eit, st) = ci(eit) + di(st) : function that measures in monetary terms
the total cost incurred by country i ∈ J from limiting its emissions to
eit, and the damages caused by the stock of pollutant st during the
time period t for the i-th country; rit ∈ R, where R is the finite cost set
and R is a subset of R, is a differentiable and convex function (r′′i ≥ 0).
.
We consider that the only way to control the stock of pollution is through
the control of emissions, that is reducing pollution is done through the re-
duction of emissions, and not through the cleaning of the environment. The
marginal cost ci of reducing emissions is higher for lower levels of emissions.
The decreasing character of the cost functions ci show the evident phe-
nomenon of the increasing costs related to the emissions reduction, i.e. The
increasing cost to decrease the emissions could be associated with filter in-
stallations or the use of other techniques.
Modes of countries behavior
The damages in each country’s environment depend on the emissions of pol-
lutant of all different countries at each time-period t that contribute to a
stock st.
In cooperative form the countries jointly choose at each period its emis-
sions levels in order to minimize the expected total discount costs, then the
resulting trajectories of emissions and stock constitute the international op-
timum.
In non-cooperative form, each country considers only the damages of
the stock of pollutant over itself. In the sense of a Nash equilibrium, the
countries minimize, at each period, only its own expected discounted costs,
with knowledge of the emissions vector ejt, with j 6= i, of the other countries.
These assumptions are similar as those in Germain, Toint, Tulkens, and
de Zeeuw (2003) and Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003), where a deterministic
model in discrete time of the dynamic of stock pollutant is presented.
2.1 Cooperative Model
In this case, one assumes that the countries behave in an internationally
optimal way, i.e. that each of them takes account of the impact of its own
industrial pollution not only on itself but on all other countries as well. It is
8
clear that the damages to the environment of country i will depend on the
emissions of all countries. We solve the problem of minimize the expected
discounted total cost for each period t ∈ T , where T is a discrete and finite
set, and for all the countries jointly (P1)
(P1) min
{eit}
E
[
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
βt [ri (eit, st)]
]
s.t. st = (1− δ)
tst−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt
eit ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, · · · , n; ∀t = 1, · · · , T
s0 > 0
The convexity of the function ri suffices to guarantee that the solution
exists and is unique. Thus, Problem (P1) has an equilibrium {e∗it}.
Remark: The resulting family of trajectories of emissions (policies) e∗it
for all players i ∈ J determined together with the resulting stock s∗t , con-
stitute the international optimum for all periods t ∈ T or a cooperative
equilibrium (see Dutta and Sundaram (1998)).
The expected value function W satisfies the Dynamic Programming equa-
tions for the problem (P1)
(P1.1) W (T, sT−1) = min
eiT
E
[
n∑
i=1
ri(eiT , sT )
]
(P1.2) W (t, st−1) = min
eit
E
[
n∑
i=1
ri(eit, st) + βW (t + 1, st)
]
∀t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1
s.t. st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt
eit ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ J
s0 > 0
If countries cooperate, they jointly solve (P1.1) and country i’s expected
total discount cost at period T is:
Wi(T, s) = ri(e
∗
iT , s
∗
T )
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where e∗iT is the optimal emission level (policy) and s
∗
T is the optimal stock
of pollutant at final period T , given
s∗T = [1− δ]s +
n∑
i=1
e∗iT
where s is the inherited stock of pollutant at the begin of period T .
In earlier periods, if countries cooperate they jointly solve (P1.2) for
1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Optimal levels of emissions and resulting stock of pollutant
are denoted by e∗it and s
∗
t respectively.
Then let denotes the country i’s expected discounted cooperative equilib-
rium cost by
Wi(t, s) = ri(e
∗
it, s
∗
t ) + βWi(t + 1, s
∗
t ) ∀t = 1, · · · , T − 1
where:
s∗t = [1− δ]s +
n∑
i=1
e∗it
Let define as τ -expected discounted cooperative total cost by
W τi ≡
τ∑
t=1
Wi(t, s
∗
t−1), 1 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1,
and the expected discounted cooperative total cost
Wi ≡
T∑
t=1
Wi(t, s
∗
t−1). (3)
2.2 Non-Cooperative Model
In an alternative mode of behaviour, we describe what would happen if the
countries do not sign a voluntary international environmental agreement.
One may assume that countries behave non cooperatively in the sense of
Nash equilibrium, where each of them minimizes at each period only its own
discounted costs, taking given the emissions of the other countries. A Nash
equilibrium is a family of strategies, one for each player, that minimize every
country i’s cost, given the strategies of all other players j 6= i. In such an
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equilibrium, no individual country has an incentive to deviate as long as the
other countries stick to their equilibrium strategies.
The considered problem is a dynamic game in discrete time and finite
horizon with only one player or country. We can adopt the perspective of
an Optimal Control Problem (OCP), where the dynamic model is a system
in discrete time st+1 = φ(st, et, ξt) for all t ∈ T with initial condition s0 and
finite horizon T < ∞.
Formally, there are n problems to solve. Actually, at each period of time
t ∈ T , each country i ∈ J solves the following problem (P2)
(P2) min
{eit}t∈{1,...,T}
E
[
T∑
t=1
βt [ri(eit, st)]
]
s.t. st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt
eit ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T ; ∀i ∈ J
s0 > 0
The expected value functions Ni, according to Bellman’s principle of opti-
mality, can be found by solving the Stochastic Dynamic Programming equa-
tions for (P2)
(P2.1) Ni(T, sT−1) = min
eiT
E [ri(eiT , sT )]
(P2.2) Ni(t, st−1) = min
eit
E [ri(eit, st) + βNi(t + 1, st)]
∀t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1
s.t. st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt
eit ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ J
s0 > 0
Remark: The resulting family of trajectories of emissions eNiT thus de-
termined for each i ∈ J , together with the resulting stock sNT , constitute
a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for all periods t ∈ T (see Dutta and
Sundaram (1998))..
The convexity of the function ri suffices to guarantee that the Nash equi-
librium exists and is unique.
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In the non cooperative equilibrium the country i’s expected total dis-
counted cost at period T is
Ni(T, s) = ri(e
N
iT , s
N
T ) ; s
N
T = [1− δ]s +
n∑
i=1
eNiT
where eNiT = {e
N
1T , e
N
2T , . . . , e
N
nT} is the vector that denotes the emissions equi-
librium level and sNT denotes the resulting stock of pollutant at final period
of time T , where s is the inherited stock of pollutant at the begin of period
of time T .
Let define as τ -expected discounted non cooperative total cost by
N τi ≡
τ∑
t=1
Ni(t, s
N
t−1), 1 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1,
and the expected discounted non cooperative total cost by
Ni ≡
T∑
t=1
Ni(t, s
N
t−1). (4)
2.3 The underlying MDP Model
We considere by MDP a Markov Decision Process (also called Markov Control
Model)together with an optimality criteria. The problems considered in this
work are discrete-time, finite-horizon and stationary MDP with expected
total reward. Then, we can express the elements of our random scenarios
through the following MDP described by a tuple
Γ = (S,E,R, P, β), (5)
where the state space S and the overall action space (or control space) E =⋃
s∈S E(s) are both countable and nonempty, E(s) is the set of admissible
actions (emissions), when the system is in each state (pollutant level) s. For
each s ∈ S the set E(s) is finite. The cost set R is a bounded countable
subset of R. For each t ≥ 1, let st, et and rt denote the state (pollutant level)
of the system, the action (emissions) taken by the decision maker (pays), and
the cost incurred at period of time t, respectively.
The stationary, single-stage, conditional transition probabilities are de-
fined by
pei,j,r := Prob (st+1 = j, rt = r/st = i, et = e) , (6)
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∀i, j ∈ S , e ∈ E(i) , r ∈ R , t ≥ 1,
∑
j∈S,r∈R
pei,j,r = 1 , i ∈ S , e ∈ E(i).
3 Probability Criteria Model
To improve the non-cooperative equilibrium we propose a different criteria
to the minimization of the expected total discounted cost with possibly mon-
etary transfers as incentive.
For each country i ∈ J we consider the problem to find a policy (emission
level) which maximize the probability that the expected discounted total cost
does not exceed a specified value X, named target. That is, for the finite
horizon model 1 ≤ t ≤ T , find a policy pii∗ = {e∗it}, in the sequel pi
i∗ = pi∗
(we omit the index i), such that
(P4) max
{eit}t∈T
{
Prob
[(
T∑
t=1
βtri(eit, st−1)
)
≤ X
]}
s.t. st = (1− δ)st−1 +
n∑
i=1
eit + ξt
eit ≥ 0
s0 > 0
where the total cost is
ri : E × S −→ R ⊂ R
is the total cost defined in section 2 by the addition of the cost and the
damage functions.
By considering a new decision-maker state, we formulate a new frame-
work for finding a policy which maximizes the probability that the expected
discounted total cost does not exceeds a specified value X, which we name
the target value.
Definition 1. The target value (X) is a quantity ranging between the
expected discounted non cooperative total cost (4) and the expected discounted
cooperative total cost (3).
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Note that the objective function in the model (P4) is equivalent to
(P4) ⇔ min
{eit}t∈T
{
−Prob
[(
T∑
t=1
βtri(eit, st−1)
)
≤ X
]}
(7)
and
(P4) ⇔ max
{eit}t∈T
{E [1Ri≤X ]} (8)
where
Ri =
(
T∑
t=1
βtri(eit, st−1)
)
In our formulation, when making a decision and taking an action at each
stage s, the decision maker considers not only the state of the original system
but also his updated target x. Thus, we consider in fact an expanded model
of MDP Γ by enlarging the state space. A similar formulation is considered
by Wu and Lin (1999) that studies the minimizing risk problems in MDP
with countable state space and reward set, and Boda, Filar, Li, and Spanjers
(2004) that consider a problem of optimal control of a retirement investment
fund over a finite time horizon with a target hitting time criteria.
A new “hybrid state (s, x) ∈ S ×R” is introduced. We refer (s, x) as the
hybrid state of the decision maker to distinguish it from the system’s state
s, where x is the target value. The dynamic of the system is now as follows:
if the initial state of the decision maker is (s, x) and an action e is taken
according to 6, the decision maker’s new hybrid state transits from (s, x) to
(j, x−r
β
) with probability pesjr.
Thus, the extended MDP Γ˜ has the following structure
Γ˜ = (S˜, E,R, P, β), (9)
where
S˜ = S × R , E =
⋃
(s,x)∈S˜
E(s, x) =
⋃
s∈S
E(s).
Note that E(s, x) = E(s), with (s, x) ∈ S˜, and the extended stationary
conditional transition probabilities are simply
pes,j,r := Prob
(
s˜t+1 =
(
j ,
x− r
β
)
/ s˜t = (s, x) , et = e
)
,
∀s, j ∈ S , e ∈ E(s) , r ∈ R , x ∈ R.
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Note that R and β are the same as in the MDP Γ given by 5.
Remark that the target x is important when making decisions and con-
sequently we must define policies which depend both on the state and the
target, that is on the hybrid state s˜ = (s, x).
3.1 Main results
In this subsection we introduce the definition of policy. The policies discussed
depend in fact on target values. The main results obtained are: (i) the
optimal value function are distribution functions of the target, and (ii) there
exists an optimal deterministic Markov policy.
Definition 2. A decision rule pit at stage t is a conditional transition prob-
ability measure on the set of admissible actions E(st) given the past history
(s˜1, e1, · · · , s˜t−1, et−1, s˜t).
Definition 3. A policy pi is a sequence of decision rules pi = {pit}t≥1. The
set of all policies is denoted by Π.
A policy pi = {pit}t≥1 ∈ Π is said to be the following.
• Markov policy, if each decision rule pit only depends on the current
state at stage t. Moreover pi is a Markov policy if each pit verifies that
pit(·/s˜1, e1, · · · , s˜t−1, et−1, s˜t) = pit(·/s˜t). The set of all Markov policies
is denoted by Πm.
• Stationary policy, if the policy pi is a Markov policy, and the decision
rules of pi are all identical, that is, pit = pi1, ∀t > 1 which is denoted
by pi = pi∞1 . The set of all stationary policies is denoted by Πs.
• Deterministic policy, is any policy pi such that all of its decision
rules pit are deterministic. The set of all deterministic Markov and de-
terministic stationary policies are denoted by Πdm and Π
d
s, respectively.
• TI-policy, a policy pi which are independent of targets xt, (t ≥ 1),
let Π0 denote the set of all TI-policies.
Note that a transition law P and a policy pi determine the conditional
probability measure Ppi. Let R
pi
τ denote the random variable that is the sum of
discounted costs generated by policy pi for the τ -stage finite horizon problem.
That is
Rpiτ =
τ∑
t=1
βt−1rt, ∀τ ≥ 1.
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Let consider the following objective function generated by policy pi ∈ Π
F piτ (s, x) = Ppi (R
pi
τ > x/s˜1 = (s, x)) , ∀τ ≥ 1. (10)
Definition 4. The following functions are called the optimal value func-
tions
F ∗τ (s, x) = inf
pi∈Π
{F piτ (s, x)} , ∀(s, x) ∈ S˜, τ ≥ 1. (11)
Obviously
F ∗τ (s, x) =
{
1 if x ≥ d(1−β
τ )
1−β
0 if x < b(1−β
τ )
1−β
(12)
where we define the lower b and the upper d bounds on the costs by
b = inf{r : r ∈ R} , d = sup{r : r ∈ R}.
Definition 5. If the policy pi∗ ∈ Π is such that F pi
∗
τ (s, x) = F
∗
τ (s, x) for all
(i, x) ∈ S˜, τ ≥ 1, then pi∗ is called a τ-stages optimal policy.
Remark: For any policy pi independent of targets {xτ}, at each period
of time τ ≥ 1, F piτ (s, x) is a distribution function of x, but this result does
not hold for general policy pi ∈ Π.
In the next step, we introduce some notation necessary to check that
dynamic programming operators possess the usual monotonicity properties,
e.g. see Puterman (2005).
Let space D = {u/u : S˜ → [0; 1],measurable} be the space of measurable
functions on the extended decision maker’s state space S˜. For any policy pi
stationary and u ∈ D, we define the dynamic programming operators: the
average cost G with emissions policies e, the average cost over all emissions
policies Kpi and the minimum of average cost K, by
Gu(s, x, e) =
∑
j∈S,r∈R
pesjru
(
j,
x− r
β
)
; (s, x) ∈ S˜, e ∈ E(s). (13)
Kpiu(s, x) =
∑
e∈E(s)
pi(e/s, x)Gu(s, x, e) ; (s, x) ∈ S˜. (14)
Ku(s, x) = min
e∈E(s)
{Gu(s, x, e)} ; (s, x) ∈ S˜. (15)
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Note that
(Kpi)0u = u,
(Kpi)τu = Kpi
(
(Kpi)τ−1u
)
,
K0u = u,
Kτu = K(Kτ−1u).
Obviously when pi is deterministic stationary policy, that is a non-randomized
policy such that
pit(·/s˜t) = pi(s˜t) ∈ E(st),
the decision rule pit at each t > 1, is non-random and the policy is a sequence
pi = (pi(s˜1), pi(s˜2), · · · ), we have
Kpiu(s, x) = Gu (s, x, pi(s, x)) .
In addition, if r0 = 0 and F
pi
0 (s, x) = Ppi (r0 ≤ x, s˜1 = (s, x)) for any policy
pi = (piτ , τ ≥ 1), then we have
F ∗0 (s, x) = I[0,∞)(x) , ∀(s, x) ∈ S˜, pi ∈ Π, (16)
where I[0,∞) is the indicator function of set [0,∞). We have the following
Lemma, which checked that the operators G, Kpi and K defined above possess
the usual monotonicity properties of dynamic programming.
Lemma 1.
(i) If u, v ∈ D, u ≤ v then Gu ≤ Gv, Kpiu ≤ Kpiv, Ku ≤ Kv.
(ii) Let u ∈ D. If u(s, x) is a non-decreasing and a left continuous function
of x for any s ∈ S, then Ku(s, x) is also non-decreasing and a left
continuous function of x for each s ∈ S.
(iii) There exists a deterministic stationary policy f such that
Kfu = Ku.
Proof.
(i) For each (s, x) ∈ S˜, e ∈ E(s),
since u
(
j,
x− r
β
)
≤ v
(
j,
x− r
β
)
, ∀(j, x) ∈ S˜,
then
∑
j∈S,r∈R
pesjru
(
j,
x− r
β
)
≤
∑
j∈S,r∈R
pesjrv
(
j,
x− r
β
)
,
and Gu(s, x, e) ≤ Gv(s, x, e).
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Additionally
Kpiu(s, x) =
∑
e∈E(s)
pi(e/s, x)Gu(s, x, e)
≤
∑
e∈E(s)
pi(e/s, x)Gv(s, x, e)
= Kpiv(s, x).
Finally, for each (s, x) ∈ S˜
min
e∈E(s)
∑
j∈S,r∈R
pesjru
(
j,
x− r
β
)
≤ min
e∈E(s)
∑
j∈S,r∈R
pesjrv
(
j,
x− r
β
)
.
Thus Ku(s, x) ≤ Kv(s, x).
provided that the minimum is taken over a finite set E(s).
(ii) For any s ∈ S, u(s, x) is a non-decreasing function of x
lim
h→0
u(s, x− h) = u(s, x).
If x1 ≤ x2 ⇒ u(s, x1) ≤ u(s, x2).
From (i) Gu(s, x1) ≤ Gu(s, x2),
min Gu(s, x1) ≤ min Gu(s, x2),
Ku(s, x1) ≤ Ku(s, x2),
and Ku is a non-decreasing function of x.
lim
h→0
Ku(s, x− h) = lim
h→0
min
e∈E(s)
Gu(s, x− h, e) = min
e∈E(s)
Gu(s, x, e),
and Ku is a left continuous function of x.
(iii) If pi = (pi1, pi2, · · · ) is a deterministic admissible policy, then
E(s) ≡ e ⇒ pi(e/s, x) ≡ 1,
Kpiu(s, x) = Gu(s, x, e) = min
e∈E(s)
Gu(s, x, e) = Ku(s, x),
and Kpiu(s, x) = Ku(s, x).
The existence of such deterministic admissible policy is guaranteed by
Herna´ndez-Lerma (1989) Proposition D3 p. 130.
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Below, we establish the “optimality principle” for the target value crite-
rion problem.
Proposition 1.
(i) The optimal value function {F ∗τ , τ ≥ 0} satisfies the optimality equa-
tions
F ∗0 = I[0,∞), F
∗
τ = KF
∗
τ−1, τ ≥ 1.
(ii) For all τ ≥ 0 and s˜ ∈ S˜, F ∗τ (s˜, R
τ
i ) is a distribution function of R
τ
i .
(iii) For any τ ≥ 0, there exists a deterministic stationary policy pi such
that F piτ = F
∗
τ .
Proof.
Note that if τ = 0 then F ∗0 (s, x) = I[0,∞)(x) holds. Assume that (i)
holds if τ = τ0. By induction assumption, for any s˜ ∈ S˜, F
∗
τ (S˜, R
τ
i )
is a distribution function of Rτi . Note that E(s, x) = E(s) is finite for
any (s, x) ∈ S. By the measurable selection theorem (see Herna´ndez-
Lerma (1989), Proposition D3, p. 130), there exists a measurable map-
ping δ from S to E such that δ(s, x) ∈ E(s) and GF ∗τ (s, x, δ(s, x)) =
KF ∗τ (s, x) for all (s, x) ∈ S, that is, δ
∞ ∈ Πds and K
δF ∗τ = KF
∗
τ .
By induction assumption, there exists a policy σ ∈ Πdm such that
F στ = F
∗
τ .
Let pi = (δ, σ). Then pi ∈ Πdm. By Lemma 1 iii) we have
F ∗τ+1(s, x) ≤ F
pi
τ+1(s, x) = K
δF στ (s, x) = K
δF ∗τ (s, x) = KF
∗
τ (s, x). (17)
On the other hand, for any η ∈ Π, by let pi = (piτ , τ ≥ 1) ∈ Π, then
F piτ (s, x) =
∑
a∈E(s)
pi1(a\s, x)
∑
j∈S,r∈R
pasjrF
pi(s,x,a)
τ−1
(
j,
x− r
β
)
, (s, x) ∈ S, τ ≥ 1,
and F piτ is determined by pi(τ), we have
F ∗τ+1(s, x) ≤ F
pi
τ+1(s, x) = K
δF στ (s, x) = K
δF ∗τ (s, x) = KF
∗
τ (s, x).
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On the other hand, for any η ∈ Π, we have
F ητ+1(s, x) = K
ηF ητ (s, x) ≥ K
ηF ∗τ (s, x) ≥ KF
∗
τ (s, x).
Hence F ∗τ+1(s, x) ≤ KF
∗
τ (s, x). Associating it with 16, we obtain that
KF ∗τ = F
∗
τ+1 = F
pi
τ+1. Thus, by Lemma 1 and 11, F
∗
τ+1(s, x) is a
distribution function of x.
Early results imply that Proposition 1 is also true when n = τ + 1. By
induction, for any n ≥ 0 holds.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Note that by solving the probabilistic problem (P4), for each country
i ∈ J = {1, 2, . . . , n} we obtain a new strategy, say pi∗i , which is related to be-
havior that in somehow fits the gap between cooperative and non-cooperative
solutions, e∗i and e
N
i respectively, for each player.
The target value (X) is a crucial element in our setting, and we find that
it could be a relevant issue in economic negotiations concerning abatement
stock pollutant policies.
4 Algorithm
We present an algorithm which computes optimal value functions, optimal
action sets, and optimal policies for a finite horizon model with the probabil-
ity criteria, using the backward recursion algorithm of dynamic programming
adapted to apply to our problem.
4.1 DP - Algorithm
We assume that S and R are both finite sets and we let R = {r1, r2, . . . , rm}
with r1 < r2 < . . . < rm. Then, by the Proposition 1 and the finiteness of S,
E and R, we have the following conclusions:
(i) For each s ∈ S and τ ≥ 1, F ∗τ (s, x) is a step distribution function of x
with finite jump points;
(ii) For each s ∈ S and τ ≥ 1, e∗τ (s, x) is a set-valued function from R to
E(s) with finite discontinuity points;
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(iii) For each τ ≥ 1, there exists an τ stages optimal deterministic Markov
policy which k-th decision rule has the structure analogous to that of
F ∗τ (s, x) and e
∗
τ (s, x), 1 < k < τ .
The following algorithm is just the proof of the earlier conclusions.
By Proposition 1, we have
F ∗0 (s, x) = I[0,∞)(x) , ∀(s, x) ∈ S˜, pi ∈ Π, x ≥ 0,
F ∗τ (s, x) = min
e∈E(s)
{ ∑
j∈S,r∈R
pesjrF
∗
τ−1
(
j,
x− r
β
)
× I[0,∞)(x− r)
}
, (18)
∀s ∈ S, x ∈ R, τ ≥ 1.
Then for notational convenience, define
bτ (s, x, e) ≡
∑
j∈S,r∈R
pesjrF
∗
τ−1
(
j,
x− r
β
)
× I[0,∞)(x− r) ,∀s ∈ S, e ∈ E(s),
Mτ (s, x) = min
e∈E(s)
{bτ (s, x, e)} , ∀s ∈ S.
With the Proposition 1, Lemma 1 and Definition 3 of optimal value func-
tions, we obtain the following algorithm.
Step 1. Calculate
b1(s, rk, e) =
∑
j∈S
∑
r∈R,r≤rk
pesjr, ∀s ∈ S, e ∈ E(s),
M1(s, rk) = min
e∈E(s)
{b1(s, rk, e)} ,∀s ∈ S,
E∗1(s, rk) = {e : e ∈ E(s), b1(s, rk, e) = M1(s, rk)} , ∀s,∈ S,
and select an action g1(s, rk) ∈ E
∗
1(s, rk), k = 1, 2, . . . ,m−1, and an arbitrary
action g1(s, rm) ∈ E(s). Then by 18 and definition of the optimal action sets
F ∗1 (s, x) =


0 if x < r1
M1(s, rk) if rk ≥ x ≥ rk+1, k = 1, . . . ,m− 1
1 if x ≥ rm
E∗1(s, x) =
{
E(s) if x < r1 or x ≥ rm
E1(s, rk) if rk ≥ x < rk+1, k = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
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Let
g1(s, x) =
{
g1(s, rm) if x < r1 or x ≥ rm
g1(s, rk) if rk ≥ x < rk+1, k = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Step 2. Assume that F ∗l , E
∗
l and gl have been calculated and all jump
points of F ∗l (i, x) (∀i ∈ S) with x1 < x2 < · · · < xρ are known. Calculate
the elements of set
{βxk + rh|k = 1, 2, . . . , ρ, h = 1, 2, . . . ,m}
and denote them by u1 < u2 < · · · < uL (L ≤ mρ), in an ascending order.
Then, for any j ∈ S and r ∈ R, we have
F ∗l (j,
x− r
β
) =


0 if x < u1
F ∗l (j,
uk−r
β
) if uk ≥ x ≥ uk+1, 1 ≤ k ≤ L
1 if x ≥ uL.
(19)
If r1 > uL, then I[0,∞)(uk − r) = 0, k = 1, . . . , L and, hence, from 17
F ∗l+1(i, uk) = 0 for all k. Or, there exists some t such that ut−1 ≤ r1 ≤ ut,
note that if r1 < u1 we can simply define u0 = r1 and take t = 1.
Calculate
bl+1(s, r1, e) =
∑
j∈S
pesjr1F
∗
l (j, 0), s ∈ S, e ∈ E(s),
bl+1(s, uk, e) =
∑
j∈S,r∈R,r≤uk
pesjrF
∗
l (j,
uk − r
β
), s ∈ S, e ∈ E(s), k ≥ N,
Ml+1(s, r1) = min
e∈E(s)
{bl+1(s, r1, e)} , ∀s ∈ S,
Ml+1(s, uk) = min
e∈E(s)
{bl+1(s, uk, E)} , ∀s ∈ S, k ≥ N,
E∗l+1(s, r1) = {e : e ∈ E(s), bl+1(s, r1, e) = Ml+1(s, r1)} , ∀s ∈ S,
E∗l+1(s, uk) = {e : e ∈ E(s), bl+1(s, uk, e) = Ml+1(s, uk)} , ∀s ∈ S, k ≥ N.
Next, select actions gl+1(s, r1) ∈ E
∗
l+1(s, r1), gl+1(s, uk) ∈ E
∗
l+1(s, uk),
k = t, . . . , L− 1, and an arbitrary action gl+1(s, uL) ∈ E(s). Then by 17, 18
and definition of optimal action sets
F ∗1 (s, x) =


0 if x < r1
M1(s, rk) if rk ≥ x ≥ rk+1, k = 1, . . . ,m− 1
1 if x ≥ rm
E∗1(s, x) =
{
E(s) if x < r1 or x ≥ rm
E1(s, rk) if rk ≥ x < rk+1, k = 1, . . . ,m− 1
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Let the decision rule at the next stage be defined by
gl+1(s, x) =


gl+1(s, r1) if r1 < x ≤ uN
gl+1(s, uk) if uk < x ≤ uk+1, k = 1, . . . ,m− 1
gl+1(s, uL) if x ≤ r1 or x > uL,
Step 3. Repeat Step 2 until l + 1 = τ , or τ = T .
We construct the optimal value function F ∗τ and an optimal policy
pi∗ = (gτ , gτ−1, . . . , g1)
∞. In the process, the corresponding optimal action
sets E∗1(s, x), E
∗
2(s, x), . . . , E
∗
τ (s, x) are constructed as well. By Proposition
1, these sets characterize all τ stages optimal policies.
4.2 Modified DP - Algorithm
The DP Algorithm can calculate the optimal value functions, optimal policies
and action sets accurately, however, it can quickly become computationally
prohibitive. At each iteration more and more points (uk) need to be con-
sidered. For a large state space, a large action space and a large reward set
this will have drastic consequences. The number of points that need to be
considered and thereby the time to do this will grow exponentially.
To overcome this problem a new algorithm is presented below. This algo-
rithm approximates the solution found by the DP Algorithm by calculating
a fixed number of points at each iteration. However, by taking this number
large enough, the approximation will be quite good and the computational
time will decrease significantly. We will that all rewards in the problem are
positive.
The idea is that (irrespective of the iteration index l) a bounded monotone
decreasing function such as F ∗l (i, x) on an interval [0, vm] can be well approxi-
mated by an array of values {(v1, F
∗
l (i, v1)), (v2, F
∗
l (i, v2)), · · · , (vm, F
∗
l (i, vm))}
provided that |vi+1 − vi| is sufficiently small. The interpolation between the
values F ∗l (i, vi) and F
∗
l (i, vi+1) at vi and vi+1 can be carried out in a number
of ways. In the implementation below upper end is used. That is,
F ∗l (i, v) = F
∗
l (i, vi+1) ∀v ∈ (vi, vi+1]
The following enhanced dynamic programming algorithm can now be
used. For notational convenience, we assume β = 1 and define
bτ (i, x, e) ≡
∑
j∈S,r∈R
peijrF
∗
τ−1 (j, x− r)× I[0,∞)(x− r) ∀i ∈ S, e ∈ E(i)
Mτ (i, x) = min
e∈E(i)
{bτ (i, x, e)} ∀i ∈ S
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Step 1. Initialize:
Choose m points v1 < v2 < · · · < vk < · · · < vm that will represent the
target values. The value of v1 needs to be N
T
i , the expected discounted total
cost of non cooperative problem. The value of vm is the largest target value
that will be computed. The larger the m, the more accurate the approxima-
tion of the optimal value functions will be. Taking equi-spaced vk’s will have
computational advantages. Now by Proposition 1
F ∗0 (i, x) =
{
0 if x ≤ v1
1 if vk−1 < x ≤ vk, k = 2, . . . ,m.
Step 2. Assume that F ∗l has been calculated. Now calculate
bl+1(i, vk, e) =
∑
j∈S,r∈R
peijrF
∗
l (j, vk − r), i ∈ S, e ∈ E(i), k ≥ 1,
Ml+1(i, vk) = min
e∈E(i)
{bl+1(i, vk, e)} , ∀i ∈ S, k ≥ 1,
E∗l+1(i, vk) = {e : e ∈ E(i), bl+1(i, vk, e) = Ml+1(i, vk)} , ∀i ∈ S, k ≥ 1.
Next, select actions gl+1(i, vk) ∈ E
∗
l+1(i, vk), with k = 1, . . . ,m. Then
F ∗l+1(i, x) =
{
0 if x ≤ v1
Ml+1(i, vk) if rk−1 < x ≤ vk, k = 2, . . . ,m
E∗l+1(i, x) =
{
E(i) if x ≤ v1
E∗l+1(i, vk) if vk−1 < x ≤ vk, k = 2, . . . ,m.
Let the decision rule at the next stage be defined by
gl+1(i, x) =
{
gl+1(i, v1) if x < v1
gl+1(i, vk) if vk−1 < x ≤ vk, k = 2, . . . ,m.
Step 3. Repeat Step 2 until l + 1 = τ or l + 1 = T .
The approximate optimal value function F ∗τ and an optimal policy
pi∗ = (gτ , gτ−1, . . . , g1)
∞ have now been constructed. In the process, the
corresponding approximate optimal action sets E∗1(i, x), E
∗
2(i, x), . . . , E
∗
τ (i, x)
have been constructed as well. By Proposition 1, these sets characterize all
τ stages optimal policies.
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5 Numerical Results
In this section, we show some numerical results obtained of solver the proba-
bilistic problem (P4), the first applied to an illustrative example with linear
reward functions ri, and the second example applied to a real scenario. The
simulations are made for a time horizon of 100 years, we give the results only
up to 2030, in order to avoid boundary problems. All computations were
made by use of the software Matlab 7.3.0 (R2006b).
We have implemented the equivalent formulation of problem (P4) given
in Section 3, following the objective function equivalents (7) and (8). Thus,
we have developed specific code for our example. All the tables are included
in the Appendix.
5.1 The Linear Case
One assumes, by definition of reward function, that
ri(eit, st) = ci(eit) + di(st)
where ci(eit) = aeit, and di(st) = bst + c, ∀a, b, c ∈ R.
Following (7) and (8) the objective linear function of the probabilistic
model (P4) has the following form
max
{eit}t∈T
{
Prob
[(
T∑
t=1
βt (ci(eit) + di(st))
)
≤ X
]}
Then the objective function of model (P4) is equal to the objective func-
tion of the following linear programming
max
{eit}t∈T
{
Prob
[(
T∑
t=1
βt (aeit + bst + c)
)
≤ X
]}
We use as target value X = 220000, and the initial conditions following
e1990 = [1.37, 0.29, 0.872, 0.805, 1.066, 3.43]
the initial CO2 vector of emissions e1990, in absence of any control are taken
from the RICE model and these emissions are measured in billion tons of
carbon, the initial stock or preindustrial level of the CO2 atmospheric stock,
is taken as 590 billion tons of carbon equivalent (s0 = 590). Finally the
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Figure 1: Optimal probabilistic non cooperative emissions elit for country i
at each period of time t in billion tons of carbon equivalent.
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discount factor per year, that appears in the objective function of problem
(P4) is taken as
β =
1
(1 + ρ)1
= 0.98
where the annual discount rate is chosen as ρ = 0.02.
The random disturbance ξt is a noise process as in (2), i.e. sequence of
i.i.d. random variables and independent of the initial state s0, with normal
distribution and
E [ξt] = 0, σ
2 = E
[
ξ2t
]
= 10, ∀t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1.
In our simulations we have estimate the expectation of the damages functions
and its probability correspondences, over 1000 runs carried out after the
corresponding 1000 values of the standard normal disturbance ξt. We obtain
the probability value of Prob = 0.8150 with the target value equal to 220000.
Table 1 column 1 gives the optimal cooperative emissions e∗it in billion
tons of CO2 equivalent for each country during each period of time t. These
results are related with problem (P4). The last row gives the cumulated
emissions per country until the end of the horizon T in billion tons of carbon.
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Figure 2: Optimal Cooperative Value Function P lit per country i for each
period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars.
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Figure 1 shows the optimal cooperative emissions e∗it for country i and per
each period of time t.
Table 1 column 2 gives the optimal probabilistic value function P lit for the
country i during each period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars. These
results are related with problem (P4). The last row gives the cumulated
value function per country and the total of the world at the end of the final
period T , measured in billions of 1990 USA dollars. Figure 2 shows the
optimal cooperative value function P lit for the country i and per each period
of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars.
Table 1 column 3 gives the probabilistic non cooperative optimal stock of
pollutant, slt at each period of time t in billion tons of carbon.
Figure 3 depicts the optimal probabilistic and non-cooperative stocks of
pollutant, slt for each period of time t in billion tons of carbon equivalent.
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Figure 3: Optimal probabilistic non-cooperative stocks
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5.2 The Real Scenario Case
A complete overview of the equations and parameter values used, can be
found in Casas and Romera (2009).
The division of the world is the same as in the RICE model. There are
6 countries or regions: USA, Japan, European Union (EU), China, Former
Soviet Union (FSU) and Rest of the World (ROW). The time is divided in
years, the initial period (period t = 0) refers to year 1990. To take account
on the long term impacts of stock pollutant, we take a long planning horizon
of 100 years, but we will only consider results until 2030 in order to avoid
boundary problems.
One assumes, by definition of target value, that
Xi = [55200, 27300, 63650, 10250, 6680, 124500]
where xi, is the target value for each country i. Each target xi was found
by simulation, country per country. And with this target values, we obtain,
for each country and their respective target values, the following optimal
28
probability values
Probr = [0.9120, 0.9180, 0.8980, 0.8830, 0.8920, 0.8860]
Figure 4: Optimal probabilistic non cooperative emissions erit for country i
at each period of time t in billion tons of carbon equivalent.
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Table 2 gives the optimal cooperative emissions erit in billion tons of CO2
equivalent for each country during each period of time t. These results are
related with problem (P4). The last row gives the cumulated emissions per
country until the end of the horizon T in billion tons of carbon. Figure 4
shows the optimal cooperative emissions erit for country i and per each period
of time t with target X.
Table 3 gives the optimal probabilistic value function P rit for each country
i during each period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars with target
X. These results are related with problem (P4). The last row gives the
cumulated value function per country and the total of the world at the end
of the final period T , measured in billions of 1990 USA dollars. Figure 5
shows the optimal cooperative value function P lit for the country i and per
each period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars with target X.
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Figure 5: Optimal Cooperative Value Function P rit per country i for each
period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars.
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Table 4 gives the probabilistic non cooperative optimal stock of pollutant,
srt at each period of time t in billion tons of carbon with target X.
Figure 6 depicts the optimal probabilistic and non-cooperative stocks of
pollutant, srt for each period of time t in billion tons of carbon equivalent
with target X.
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Figure 6: Optimal probabilistic non-cooperative stocks
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6 Final Remarks
In this paper we propose a new model with probability performance criteria
and we obtain the existence of an optimal policy. In absence of international
cooperation, these optimal policies obtained under this new perspective could
be an alternative behavior for each country which finally will help reducing
the international stock pollutant. Note that the target value (X) could be
chosen by each country, according some particular negotiation. Usually the
target value (X) should be a quantity ranging between the non-cooperative
value function and the cooperative value function. These schemes are also
suitable in the context of coalitional rationality.
Summarizing our results, for each country i ∈ J and each period t ∈ T
we obtain the optimal stocks pollution {srt}, emissions {e
r
it}, the probability
values and values functions {Pi(t, s
r
t−1)} with a target value given.
We find of interest to consider stochastic performance criteria based on
bounds of probability, i.e., MDP with percentile performance criteria where
the decision-maker wants to find a policy that achieves a specific value (tar-
get) at a specified probability level α, or α-percentile criteria.
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Further research could be done if we consider uncertainty about the ran-
dom perturbation (the variance of the i.i.d. sequence). We propose to esti-
mate the parameter recursively and to include the estimation in the stochastic
control problem.
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Table 1: Optimal probabilistic non cooperative emissions elit, Value Function
P lit and stock s
l
t for country i at each period of time t in billion tons of carbon
equivalent for linear case with target X.
t el
it
P l
it
sl
t
1 1.4650 1596.1820 537.8340
2 1.3931 1456.0505 490.3380
3 1.4307 1329.4736 447.1970
4 1.4186 1214.0498 407.9654
5 1.4591 1109.5905 372.3404
6 1.4462 1014.2473 339.9409
7 1.4156 927.3518 310.4559
8 1.3719 848.1165 283.6073
9 1.4521 777.1436 259.2796
10 1.4145 711.7523 237.1255
11 1.4315 652.7073 217.0024
12 1.4492 599.0960 198.7260
13 1.4622 550.3752 182.1240
14 1.4438 505.8222 167.0128
15 1.3876 464.8828 153.2189
16 1.4106 428.2401 140.7019
17 1.4635 395.3043 129.3756
18 1.4617 365.0139 119.0771
19 1.4110 336.9918 109.6640
20 1.4594 312.3067 101.1549
21 1.3758 288.7449 93.3357
22 1.4053 268.1352 86.2568
23 1.4513 249.6661 79.8674
24 1.3710 231.8015 73.9784
25 1.3839 216.1882 68.6377
26 1.3903 201.9763 63.7888
27 1.3899 189.0125 59.3802
28 1.4304 177.6265 55.4130
29 1.3972 166.6980 51.7731
30 1.3899 156.8977 48.4568
31 1.3715 147.8542 45.4236
32 1.4447 140.4641 42.7393
33 1.4145 132.9939 40.2688
34 1.4632 126.8678 38.0716
35 1.4166 120.5386 36.0275
36 1.4119 115.0288 34.1644
37 1.4546 110.4684 32.5135
38 1.4225 105.7413 30.9805
39 1.3903 101.3280 29.5547
40 1.4372 97.9771 28.3054
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Table 2: Optimal probabilistic non cooperative emissions erit for each country
at each period of time t in billion tons of carbon equivalent with target X.
t USA Japan EU China FSU ROW Total
0 1.3700 0.2920 0.8720 0.8050 1.0660 3.4300 7.8350
1 1.3997 0.3617 0.9453 0.8862 1.0946 3.4522 8.1397
2 1.3749 0.3411 0.9142 0.8660 1.1054 3.5004 8.1021
3 1.4393 0.3676 0.9681 0.8751 1.1163 3.4822 8.2488
4 1.4350 0.3389 0.8792 0.8142 1.1382 3.5233 8.1289
5 1.4683 0.3086 0.9273 0.8475 1.0966 3.5013 8.1497
6 1.4253 0.3601 0.9012 0.8426 1.0772 3.4528 8.0591
7 1.4100 0.3883 0.9578 0.8216 1.1103 3.4750 8.1630
8 1.3899 0.3707 0.9056 0.8883 1.1127 3.4472 8.1143
9 1.4325 0.3604 0.9400 0.8889 1.0675 3.5269 8.2161
10 1.4433 0.3385 0.8773 0.8502 1.1324 3.4656 8.1073
11 1.4076 0.3015 0.9077 0.9007 1.1384 3.4349 8.0907
12 1.3710 0.3565 0.9218 0.8197 1.0942 3.5055 8.0687
13 1.4120 0.3265 0.9154 0.8920 1.0922 3.5195 8.1576
14 1.4454 0.3040 0.9282 0.8819 1.1368 3.4586 8.1550
15 1.4494 0.3467 0.9337 0.8494 1.1444 3.4551 8.1786
16 1.4620 0.3723 0.8833 0.8671 1.1646 3.5233 8.2726
17 1.4545 0.3574 0.9618 0.9002 1.1133 3.4431 8.2303
18 1.4068 0.3899 0.9475 0.8690 1.1563 3.5241 8.2935
19 1.4321 0.3862 0.9511 0.8297 1.1111 3.5002 8.2104
20 1.4431 0.2959 0.9535 0.8403 1.1465 3.5148 8.1940
21 1.3894 0.3260 0.9390 0.8238 1.1489 3.4509 8.0780
22 1.4605 0.3449 0.8921 0.8541 1.0826 3.4755 8.1096
23 1.4269 0.3162 0.8993 0.8459 1.1054 3.4381 8.0318
24 1.4332 0.3497 0.9346 0.8514 1.1181 3.5151 8.2021
25 1.3934 0.2949 0.9257 0.8661 1.1378 3.4862 8.1042
26 1.4249 0.3471 0.8780 0.8121 1.1229 3.4619 8.0469
27 1.4632 0.3601 0.8809 0.8364 1.1121 3.4675 8.1201
28 1.4035 0.3862 0.8991 0.8658 1.1105 3.5168 8.1820
29 1.4356 0.3651 0.9129 0.8225 1.0748 3.4672 8.0780
30 1.4092 0.3640 0.9194 0.8671 1.1103 3.4374 8.1074
31 1.4327 0.3332 0.9629 0.8296 1.1026 3.4500 8.1110
32 1.4399 0.3534 0.9316 0.8637 1.0963 3.4349 8.1199
33 1.4097 0.3703 0.9049 0.8556 1.1512 3.4867 8.1784
34 1.4114 0.2984 0.9198 0.8515 1.1419 3.4422 8.0652
35 1.4355 0.3845 0.9317 0.8591 1.1610 3.4822 8.2541
36 1.4538 0.3816 0.8881 0.8992 1.1218 3.4417 8.1862
37 1.4072 0.3502 0.9549 0.8392 1.0674 3.5070 8.1259
38 1.4125 0.3154 0.9676 0.8452 1.1256 3.4675 8.1338
39 1.4295 0.3773 0.9316 0.8358 1.1476 3.5123 8.2341
40 1.4266 0.3413 0.8749 0.8462 1.1637 3.4347 8.0873
Total 57.0005 13.9325 36.8693 34.2008 44.7516 139.0818
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Table 3: Optimal Probabilistic Non Cooperative Value Function P rit for each
country i for each period of time t in billions of 1990 USA dollars.
t USA Japan EU China FSU ROW Total
1 4.949 5.366 6.843 0.544 0.605 7.952 26.258
2 19.517 11.779 25.862 1.904 2.373 31.761 93.196
3 43.159 26.372 57.065 4.296 5.242 71.152 207.286
4 75.575 42.815 99.157 7.786 9.170 126.127 360.630
5 116.150 65.099 151.599 12.175 14.107 196.526 555.656
6 164.690 92.268 213.768 17.743 20.044 282.556 791.069
7 220.261 123.562 284.116 24.530 26.683 382.268 1061.420
8 282.720 156.028 362.521 31.667 34.202 496.857 1363.995
9 349.980 191.995 446.924 40.284 42.706 622.404 1694.293
10 423.282 230.876 538.664 50.521 51.195 763.889 2058.427
11 502.264 272.354 634.226 60.595 60.609 917.211 2447.260
12 585.973 315.002 734.297 73.960 70.972 1078.946 2859.150
13 670.194 359.128 837.257 85.197 81.373 1251.438 3284.587
14 757.295 404.690 942.082 99.059 91.512 1435.908 3730.545
15 847.112 449.534 1048.226 114.474 102.285 1626.273 4187.904
16 937.201 494.782 1155.903 129.261 112.955 1818.940 4649.043
17 1029.170 540.184 1259.400 144.330 124.807 2025.260 5123.152
18 1122.824 584.754 1364.138 162.018 135.112 2227.238 5596.084
19 1213.448 629.149 1467.929 181.034 147.083 2440.439 6079.082
20 1304.186 675.464 1569.906 198.810 157.396 2655.098 6560.859
21 1399.364 717.210 1671.883 218.505 168.415 2880.092 7055.469
22 1484.428 758.421 1772.513 236.578 181.007 3100.321 7533.267
23 1575.614 800.894 1868.132 256.985 191.180 3328.057 8020.862
24 1659.194 837.317 1954.929 276.758 201.032 3542.063 8471.293
25 1745.600 878.296 2042.489 296.672 210.554 3766.427 8940.038
26 1824.538 910.501 2130.305 320.548 220.910 3991.662 9398.464
27 1898.579 943.259 2208.315 340.465 230.684 4209.940 9831.241
28 1976.696 973.152 2279.085 360.122 239.658 4419.745 10248.458
29 2045.803 1003.790 2348.330 384.243 249.861 4639.845 10671.872
30 2116.553 1031.572 2412.971 403.657 256.846 4854.243 11075.842
31 2179.239 1059.499 2470.066 427.740 265.139 5061.795 11463.478
32 2240.120 1081.922 2528.721 447.933 273.004 5268.084 11839.784
33 2300.321 1102.261 2581.613 470.361 277.833 5461.790 12194.179
34 2357.107 1130.231 2629.724 493.240 285.203 5667.494 12562.999
35 2403.557 1139.425 2668.665 514.610 290.514 5850.514 12867.285
36 2449.690 1155.875 2711.899 534.613 298.142 6042.108 13192.327
37 2501.945 1173.885 2741.848 560.813 306.571 6224.744 13509.806
38 2545.572 1191.953 2773.867 583.294 309.397 6413.434 13817.516
39 2582.507 1197.174 2804.503 606.212 313.324 6584.189 14087.908
40 2623.725 1212.716 2840.040 629.036 317.748 6774.550 14397.814
Total 52580.100 25970.554 60639.783 9802.571 6377.453 118539.337 273909.797
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Table 4: Optimal probabilistic stocks of pollutant non cooperative srt for each
period t in billion tons of carbon equivalent with target X.
t sr
t
0 590.0000
1 544.5887
2 503.2917
3 465.7098
4 431.6674
5 400.5691
6 372.1760
7 346.5303
8 323.1425
9 301.9700
10 282.6366
11 265.1027
12 249.1796
13 234.5776
14 221.3860
15 209.4455
16 198.5148
17 188.5776
18 179.5473
19 171.2710
20 163.9237
21 157.1870
22 150.8389
23 145.2260
24 140.0085
25 135.2929
26 131.0180
27 127.2437
28 123.7602
29 120.5500
30 117.7626
31 115.1078
32 112.8148
33 110.6808
34 108.6996
35 106.9226
36 105.3961
37 103.9672
38 102.7126
39 101.6355
40 100.5178
39
